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Abstract 
As new technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) are integrated into Critical National Infrastructures (CNI), new 
cybersecurity threats emerge that require specific security solutions. Approaches used for analysis include the modelling and 
simulation of critical infrastructure systems using attributes, functionalities, operations, and behaviours to support various 
security analysis viewpoints, recognising and appropriately managing associated security risks. With several critical 
infrastructure protection approaches available, the question of how to effectively model the complex behaviour of interconnected 
CNI elements and to configure their protection as a system-of-systems remains a challenge. Using a systematic review approach, 
existing critical infrastructure protection approaches (tools and techniques) are examined to determine their suitability given 
trends like IoT, and effective security modelling and analysis issues. It is found that empirical-based, agent-based, system 
dynamics-based, and network-based modelling are more commonly applied than economic-based and equation-based 
techniques, and empirical-based modelling is the most widely used.  The energy and transportation critical infrastructure sectors 
reflect the most responsive sectors, and no one Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) approach – tool, technique, methodology 
or framework – provides a ‘fit-for-all’ capacity for all-round attribute modelling and simulation of security risks. Typically, 
deciding factors for CIP choices to adopt are often dominated by trade-offs between ‘complexity of use’ and ‘popularity of 
approach’, as well as between ‘specificity’ and ‘generality’ of application in sectors. Improved security modelling is feasible 
via; appropriate tweaking of CIP approaches to include a wider scope of security risk management, functional responsiveness 
to interdependency, resilience and policy formulation requirements, and collaborative information sharing between public and 
private sectors. 
 
1 Introduction 
Critical infrastructure (CI) involves elements that are 
fundamental to the normal operations of the human society [1],  
an can be defined as  referring to any asset, system or part 
thereof which is critical for the maintenance of vital societal 
functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-
being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which 
would have a very substantial impact as a result of the failure 
to maintain those functions [2]. Arguably, it may be viewed as 
a nation’s economic “central nervous system” [3] – making it 
difficult for nations without a properly functional, or indeed 
with vulnerable CI to attain and sustain its national goals  of 
social and economic progress and development. Examples of 
CIs include; Energy (electricity, oil, natural gas), Chemical, 
Industrial Control, Dams, Defence Industries, Emergency 
Services, Financial Services, Food and Agriculture, 
Government facilities, Commercial Services, Health and 
Public Health, Transportation, (Railways, Roads, Highways, 
Aviation, Shipping and Ports), Water and Waste water, 
Information Technology and Telecommunication, Nuclear [2], 
[4], [5]. 
There are growing concerns and debates about the protection 
of these types of CI systems, especially, how to effectively 
protect them given their vital positions in social and economic 
developments. These concerns have been highlighted with the 
increased emphasis on improved efficiency, performance and 
productivity, and this implies that CIs now rarely exist or 
function in isolation. Rather, they are becoming more tightly 
coupled into a system of (inter)dependent infrastructures, and 
converging with information and communications technology 
(ICT) and the Internet [6], [7]. This creates a complex multi-
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system interconnectedness and interactions referred to as a 
system-of-systems (SoS) [8].  
The growing trend for convergence and multi-system 
interconnectedness in CIs is introducing several security issues 
that threaten normal economic and social functions. As new 
technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) get integrated 
into CNI, new security risks (threats, vulnerabilities and 
attacks) emerge that require specific security solutions [9]. The 
risks are particularly hard to identify, and handle given that the 
IoT has emerged from a range of disparate fields of study [10]. 
The benefits of CIs can be realised if they function properly 
and are not impaired. This requires CIs to be kept safe from 
harm, and secure from any disruptive or destructive 
compromise. Thus, it is crucial to protect CIs, especially in the 
light of the growing and evolving malignity.  It is important to 
understand potential security risks and how to effectively 
manage them using effective protection tools and techniques.  
In the above context, the objective of protection may be 
explored through understanding how the attributes and 
capabilities of existing CI protection (security) modelling 
approaches fit and respond to the dynamics introduced by the 
evolving critical infrastructure and attack ecosystems. With 
the increasing adoption of IoT, it is crucial to track and 
understand research and development directions and 
outcomes, together with policy and regulatory interventions, 
which can better support security for critical national 
infrastructure (CNI) systems. CNIs provide some national 
benefits including; supporting the attainment of a properly 
functioning social environment and economic markets, 
enhancing service security, enabling external market 
integrations, and allowing service recipients (consumers, 
clients, and users) to benefit from new and emerging 
technological developments [3]. As such, their safe and 
resilient operation is imperative and effectively protection is 
required. Modelling and simulation (M&S) provide a useful 
technique to help achieve this. In terms of CIs, M&S provide 
focused methods for analysing the dynamics of CI 
components, evaluating the interdependency and cascading 
effects amongst infrastructures based on system interactions 
[7]. M&S uses the attributes, functionalities, operations, and 
behaviours of CI sub-systems to support various security 
analysis viewpoints, recognising and appropriately managing 
associated security risks. With several critical infrastructure 
protection approaches available, the question of how to 
effectively model the complex behaviour of interconnected 
CNI elements and configure their protection as (SoS) remains 
a challenge. 
This study provides novel insights on the effectiveness of 
existing CIP approaches (tools, techniques and 
methodologies) to address IoT-centric security risks, in order 
to guide the selection, adoption and/or development of more 
tailored approaches. This can provide a usable reference 
critical infrastructure security system developers, researchers 
and users. This contribution is achieved via a systematic and 
analytical study of available CIP tools, techniques, 
methodologies and frameworks herein collectively referred to 
as ‘CIP Approaches’. The extent of risk management coverage 
for CIP approaches and their security responsiveness to the 
dynamic modelling landscape are evaluated through 
investigating: (i) Common CIP modelling approaches, (ii) the 
industrial sectors most responsive to CIP modelling and 
simulations, (iii) the sub-stages of risk management mostly 
covered by existing CIP approaches, (iv) the extent to which 
resilience, (inter)dependency and policy formulation factors 
are considered in existing CIP Approaches.  
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 presents 
the related work. Section 3 describes the methodology used in 
the research. Section 4 presents the results and discussion, 
while Section 5, concludes the article and outlines 
recommendations based on our research. 
2  Related Works 
There is also a growing recognition and acknowledgement that 
to effectively preserve operational continuity in CIs, resilience 
is a necessary protection objective to complement security 
capacities [11], [12]. Resilience can be defined as the capacity 
to prevent, adapt, withstand and recover swiftly from both 
intentional and unintentional attacks [4], [13]. There are 
publications [14], [15] which emphasise that the 
understanding, modelling, and simulation of CI attributes, 
functions, operations and behaviours can support security 
analysis, especially given dynamicity in trends and 
technological adoption. Prior works [16]–[19] that have 
explored CIP modelling and simulation approaches does not 
cover newer approaches, such as the  Industrial Control 
System Cyber Defence Triage Process (ICS-CDTP) [20]. 
These works also fail to address emerging needs such as 
resilience and support for security policy updates/formulation 
in modern CIs. This study takes a step towards providing some 
answers to fill gaps in existing literature. 
 
3  Methodology 
To achieve our research objectives, a systematic review 
approach [21] was used to identify and select related and 
relevant literature sources. This review technique can 
guarantee the quality and reliability of selected articles [22]. 
 
3.1 Literature Gathering 
Searches for relevant literature was conducted using the Web 
of Science (WoS) article database. WoS was chosen because 
of its reputation for supervised selection and inclusion of 
materials drawing from high-quality and high-impact indexing 
by humans, consistent and structured documentation, better 
accuracy of results, and reduced duplicates and false positives 
[23]. In addition, WoS is the preferred choice and standard 
employed by most organisations [24]. Results were restricted 
to peer-reviewed articles (journals, conferences, reports, 
books, etc.) in order to ensure quality and credibility of 
outcomes. Key search phrases used were: ‘Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Tools’, ‘Critical Infrastructure 
Security Techniques’, ‘Critical Infrastructure Security 
Methodologies’, and ‘Critical Infrastructure Security 
Management Methods’. Figure 1 presents the literature 
gathering process-flow. 
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Initial search rounds using the above terms yielded a total 
search result of 1171 articles (represented as N) that included 
duplicated articles. Exclusion filtering – represented as e – was 
done based on titles to identify articles related to critical 
infrastructure protection. Unrelated articles were discarded, 
and only one instance each of relevant articles was retained. 
303 related articles were obtained from the process, which 
reflected the initial selection study sample; n. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Literature Gathering Process 
However, further inclusion filtering – represented as i; was 
performed to narrow the contextual scope and to select the 
most relevant articles that support the research objectives. 
These incudes:  
i.) Articles on theoretical developments and(or) 
applications of security on industrial critical 
infrastructures. 
ii.) Articles on security modelling, analysis and(or) 
implementation techniques or tools with use case 
applications in industrial critical infrastructure 
sectors. 
iii.) Articles on security risk assessment and management 
techniques/methods related to critical infrastructures.  
3.2 Literature Gathering Outcomes 
Based on the above criteria, 131 distinct CIP modelling, 
simulation, and/or implementation approaches characterising 
software tools, techniques, methodologies, and frameworks 
were compiled from journal and conference articles, reports, 
white paper, and guidelines. These are presented in Appendix 
A. These spanned from 1999 to 2017 and formed the final 
selection study sample (Figure 1). 
 
3.3 Evaluation Criteria 
The sample of the CIP approaches identified were evaluated 
based on criteria identified to be important for classifying CIP 
approaches. Most of which have been used in previous works. 
These criteria include; critical infrastructure types; applicable 
modelling technique; risk management sub-stages covered; 
and (inter)dependency and resilience modelling 
considerations. 
 
Other criteria such as maturity and availability of CI tools were 
not used, although these have been used in the past [3] to 
evaluate CI tools. We think that there are uncertainties in 
accurately determining the maturity and availability status of 
some of the CIP tools given that they are mostly developed and 
used in-house, and as such this is an unreliable criterion to use. 
Reports and documentation on their use and effectiveness are 
not readily available in public domain. Similarly, whether they 
have been discarded, modified or upgraded, and at what point; 
is an information not easily available in the public domain. We 
think that adopting such criteria with potential for inaccurate 
data can greatly affect the accuracy of the overall study. 
 
3.3.1 Critical Infrastructure Type: This is considered in order 
to highlight the varied levels of infrastructure criticality. In the 
UK, some CIs are categorised ‘critical national infrastructures’ 
– CNI, perhaps because of their huge contribution to the 
national economy. For example, the energy sector has an 
unrivalled value, a failure of which can cripple the functions 
of other CI sectors like emergency services, communications, 
health and transport, thus threatening national economy, social 
and political order [25]. 
 
3.3.2 Modelling Technique: This is considered because it 
connotes foundational representation of how each protection 
methodology is designed and applied. Although, CIP 
methodologies and techniques suggest varied modelling and 
simulation paradigms, and purpose-driven decision-making 
processes, they share a common goal exploring how to manage 
security risks. CIP modelling techniques may be classified 
into; agent-based, system dynamics, empirical, network, 
economic, and other (equation-based, real-time simulation, 
and cellular automata) techniques [26]. These may also be 
combined with additional computational methods such as 
discrete time-step, continuous time-step, Monte Carlo, 
decision-trees, geographical information systems, event 
monitoring, and risk management [3]. 
 
3.3.3 Risk Management: This context is considered because it 
provides a useful way of evaluating and responding to security 
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issues in critical national infrastructure contexts [3], [16], [27], 
[28]. Most critical infrastructure protection implementations 
are typically based on risk management frameworks conceived 
as national or global standards [3]. Risk management 
approaches often vary either by; the nature of approach, or by 
how risk is measured [29], [30].   
 
In this study, the ‘nature of approach’ is considered (nature of 
approach) – emphasising the criticality of assets, the potential 
harm that can be done to them, and the rippling 
interdependency effects that can affect other connected assets 
on the criticality chain. Thus, supported risk management sub-
stages in each CIP approach are analysed based on the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) Critical 
Infrastructure Risk Management framework (RMF) [4] to 
underscore the purpose served by each. NIPP-RMF provides 
the most commonly supported guidelines in security 
objectives, strategies, and sector coverage. It also provides 
reference points to a broader community of nation states and 
infrastructure sectors exploring the development of tailored 
infrastructure security methodologies, tools and techniques 
[4].  
 
NIPP-RMF suggests that risk management tools, techniques, 
and methodologies for CNI protection can be classified 
according to the purpose they serve, demonstrated by the sub-
stage(s) (Figure 2) of the overall CI risk management 
framework that is (are) supported, while applying each 
approach, and the associated outputs [4]. In the framework, CI 
elements can be physical, cyber and human. The framework 
also includes a process of recurrent information sharing and 
feedback into subsequent risk management sub-stages. Aside 
from the initial sub-stage of ‘setting security goals and 
objectives’, the key sub-stages of the framework used as 
evaluation criteria are: (i) identification of infrastructure 
assets, (ii) assessment and analysis of risks, (iii) risk 
management implementation (involving risk prioritisation, 
and risk control) and (iv) measurement of effectiveness. 
 
 
Figure 2: Revised NIPP Critical Infrastructure Risk Management 
Framework [4] 
3.3.4 Interdependency and Resilience: Interdependency is a 
condition created by direct and/or indirect interconnectedness 
of CIs via geographically-distributed networks and physical 
hardware-based channels [8]. A disruption event can then 
spread consequences across channels of CIs, and society – 
technically called ‘cascading effects’ [31], [32]. The harm 
from compromises can be physical, digital, economic, 
psychological, reputational,  social and societal [33]–[35]. 
Since impact-flows across CI are as probable as the actual 
cyber-attacks themselves, it is crucial to understand the risks 
via modelling and simulations, in order to provide effective 
protection. Indeed, identifying and characterising 
interdependencies and complexities associated to CIs can 
improve the understanding of CIs as a SoS [36]–[38]. The 
insights that may be gained from failure and impact modelling 
and simulations can support the design of effective controls 
and response strategies [39]. 
 
Resilience describes a capacity to stop, cope with, acclimatize 
to, and/or recuperate from incidents that have negative 
consequences [4], [12]. With resilience in CIs, infrastructure 
functions, operations and services are reasonably maintained 
even in the face of an infrastructure disruption or compromise 
[33]. With attacks that cause cascades and failures, impacts can 
be economically and socially massive, so the need to be well-
equipped to withstand and recuperate from adverse events is 
ever more necessary. Quite often, CI incidents happen 
unexpectedly, and complete control is rarely feasible. The 
dynamic threats and hazards landscape is such that it is hardly 
possible to foresee, prevent, prepare for, or control all CI 
security incidents, which in most cases can be unknown or 
emergent [33]. This necessitates a shift from the usual crisis 
management to resilience management to address supply chain 
disruptions and rapid restoration. 
 
Appropriate readiness and recovery requires strengthening and 
investing in resilience to minimise sub-system vulnerabilities 
to restrict occurrence, intensity and propagation of failures and 
impacts on CIs and in turn on society [12]. It is appropriate that 
‘resilience’ is becoming fundamental in general crisis and 
disaster management discourse, and is the focus of widespread 
efforts for resisting, absorbing, accommodating and 
recovering from the effects of security threats.  This 
emphasises effort on preventive, mitigative and preparedness 
activities prior to a CI security crisis, response during the 
crisis, and the recovery after the crisis [13]. Integral 
dependencies and failure cascades should be considered in 
analysing and designing for resilience, and they should 
underscore the whole cycle of a CI security crisis, since it is 
impractical to guard against all threats [40], [41]. 
 
4  Results and Discussions 
CIP approaches were analysed based on obtained information 
obtained about them from bibliographic literatures: reports, 
articles, white papers and guideline to arrive at informed 
insights. The list of approaches in Appendix A reflects a wide 
range of research being conducted in the area of critical 
infrastructure protection and considered relevant in the light of 
keeping pace with new trends like the IoT. The results of 
evaluating 131 CIP modelling approaches are thus presented. 
 
4.1 Results 
 
4.1.1 Common modelling techniques applied in the CIP 
approaches  
For modelling techniques, we find that a variety of techniques 
are in use as shown in Figure 3. Empirical-based modelling 
appears to attract the widest application with 36 (27.3%) of 
reviewed approaches in its favour. Examples of approaches in 
this category include: HURT, FTA, RVA, and RMCIS. 
Network-based modelling is seen in 32 (24.2%) approaches 
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including CASCADE, IRRIIS, and HAZOP. System 
dynamics-based modelling is used in 20 (about 15.2%) 
approaches including AIMSUN, CIPMA, and ICS-CDTP. 
Agent-based modelling is applied in 26 (19.7%) approaches 
including, CIMS, ADVISE, N-ABLE and GoRAF. Some CIP 
approaches combine two or more techniques. For example, 
ACT combines economy-based and system dynamics-based 
modelling, while ADVISE and GoRAF both combine agent-
based and real-time simulation techniques. 
 
4.1.2 Industrial sectors most responsive to CIP modelling and 
simulations 
Results of sector-based classification shown in Figure 4 
indicates that 72 (54.5%) CIP approaches applied to energy 
comprising electricity, pipeline & oil, natural gas sectors. 42 
(37.1%) CIP approaches applied to the transportation sector. 
Water & Waste Water has 47 (35.6%) and Chemical sector 
has 41 (31.1%) among others. Emergency Services has the 
least with 13 (9.8%) applicable CIP approaches. 
 
From a multi-sector applications viewpoint, 111 (84.1%) of 
the CIP approaches mainly cover up to 5 sectors (1-5 sectors). 
60 out of the 111 provide software support for engaging and 
implementing their designed operational processes. Only 4 
(3%) of the CIP approaches mainly cover between 6 to 10 
sectors. These include: IIM, Risk Map, RVA, and BLDMP. Of 
the CIP approaches. 16 (12.1%), cover at least 11 CI sectors 
including; Athena, BIRR, CASCADE, CIDA, CIMSuite, 
CIPDSS-DM, EURACOM, Fort Future, IRRIS, ACT and ICS-
CDTP. 
 
 
Figure 3: Modelling Techniques 
 
Figure 4:  Sector-based Analysis of Occurrence of Critical 
Infrastructure Modelling and Protection Approaches 
 
Figure 5: Risk Management Stages Covered 
 
Figure 6: Analysis of Interdependency and Resilience 
Characteristics 
4.1.3 Risk management sub-stages covered  
98 (74%) CIP approaches (Figure 5) included aspects related 
to ‘identification of critical infrastructures and vulnerabilities’ 
sub-stage. 91 (68%) CIP approaches considered the 
‘assessment of risks’ sub-stage. 82 (62%) CIP approach 
considered some sort of ‘risk management implementation’, 
which is  a sub-stage comprising ‘risk prioritisation’ and ‘risk 
control’ based on the Revised NIPP Critical Infrastructure 
Risk Management framework [4]. From these, 20 (nearly 24%) 
approaches considered ‘risk prioritisation’ alone without 
‘control implementations’, while 29 (nearly 35%) approaches 
considered ‘risk control implementation’ alone without any 
form of prioritisation. 34 (nearly 26%) CIP approaches 
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considered ‘effectiveness evaluation’ sub-stage of the revised 
NIPP-RMF. 
 
Looking at the risk management implementation sub-stages 
(prioritisation and control) in isolation, more CIP approaches 
(58) i.e., 44% of 131 characterised a sort of risk control 
implementation than risk prioritisation which had 49 CIP 
approaches. The 58 tools also represent 54% of the CIP 
approaches categorised under the risk implementation stage. 
Only half (29) approaches considered both risk prioritisation 
and control implementation stages, the remaining half 
considered just one of the two stages. In addition, fewer 
approaches consider all five sub-stages exclusively. 49% of the 
CIP approaches considered only two sub-stages, which most 
typically include: risk identification and risk assessment. Only 
6 (4.5%) of CIP approaches considered all five sub-stages. 
These include: BIRR, COUNTERACT, EURACOM, IRRIIS, 
NSRAM, and NIPP-RMF itself.  This latter category of 
approaches exists as broad guiding frameworks (NIPP-RMF) 
or methodologies (BIRR, COUNTERACT, EURACOM, 
IRRIIS) or a complex modelling tool with software support 
(NSRAM). The methodologies and framework are mostly 
applicable to a generality of CI sectors, while the software 
modelling tool NSRAM is applicable for chemical, energy and 
IT/Communications sectors. 
 
4.1.4 Interdependency and Resilience considerations  
Only 28, or 21%, of reviewed approaches considered elements 
of interdependency modelling (Figure 6). Examples of 
approaches with explicit characterisation of interdependencies 
include:  AIMS, Athena, CASCADE, CIPMA, CISIA, N-ABLE, 
NEMO, and UIS. We assume these considerations of 
interdependency phenomena may be connected to the core 
objectives for developing the tools in the first place. This may 
be influenced by an acknowledgement of criticality of 
interdependencies for both constructive and destructive 
impacts on CI operations. Behavioural and cascading effects 
of functions and failures appear to be at the core of the 
objectives for developing most of the listed approaches in this 
group. 
 
For resilience coverage, only 18 (14%) out of the 131 CIP 
approaches clearly considered aspects related to resilience 
modelling (Figure 6). Examples in this category include: 
BIRR, CIMS, CIPMA, DECRIS, EURACOM, Fort Future, 
IIM, MBRA, HAZOP, Risk Maps, RAMCAP-Plus, Sandia Risk 
Assessment Methodology, NIPP-RMF, and RMCIS. Potential 
reasons why a greater proportion of CIP approaches do not 
consider resilience attributes may relate to: (i) the core 
objectives of their developments, which points to perceived 
requirements for protecting critical infrastructures. Resilience 
may not have been part of the requirements for development. 
(ii) the development time for the CIP approaches, which may 
have predated the concept of resilience in critical 
infrastructures – CI resilience may not have been clearly 
defined and/or gained wide attention.  Thus, it is assumed that 
the CIP approaches that have considered resilience may have 
emerged as responses to newer challenges associated with 
convergence and hyper-connectivity trends, which have made 
resilience a necessary objective. Only 4 (3.1%) CIP 
approaches considered both resilience and (inter)dependency 
modelling attributes, as well as policy and regulatory 
formulation attributes. 
 
4.2 Discussion of Findings 
On a general base, a huge proportion of the sample of CIP 
approaches exist as either tools, techniques or methodological 
frameworks. The approaches seem mostly structured to handle 
operations and performance modelling and simulations, rather 
than security. However, they can also be used for security-
related attributes such as evaluating the impact of security 
features or their absence with critical infrastructures. In 
addition, it is not clear how much of IoT performance and 
security are reflected in the reviewed CIP approaches. This 
may be because most of the approaches predate the IoT trend.  
A common characteristic shared by these the various CIP 
approaches is that they are all based on risk management, 
although they are distinguishable by the scope or sub-stage of 
overall security risk management functions considered in each 
approach. 
 
We find that the common modelling techniques which receive 
widespread interest and adoption include: agent-based, 
system dynamics-based, network-based and empirical-based. 
These are not the only applicable techniques but only represent 
the most commonly used, and a quite applicable for IoT 
contexts too. Newer techniques may be defined from 
combining two or more of the above, or even entirely new 
modelling paradigms depending on intended development 
goals. The aim being to enable a multi-level modelling and 
simulation to meet the various requirements that may be set by 
IoT.  
 
At the moment, the empirical-based model seems to be most 
widely employed for CIP research and the development of 
security approaches. This is closely followed by network-
based and system dynamics-based modelling techniques. 
These preferences could link to growing data-driven 
technology trends and reflect an increasing need to understand 
and evaluate CI security using real or actual historic data and 
drawing from expert knowledge and experiences.  
 
For IoT-based critical infrastructures, this is good news, 
because IoT systems typically characterise huge volume of 
data from sensors connected to CI components. Empirical 
modelling can enable a simulation system involving the 
collection and dissemination of such sensor-acquired CI data 
and their management via a context-aware data distribution 
service to be used by application [42]. Potential applications 
include smart cloud services that can take and integrate such 
data with other available data (crowd-sourced or crowd-
sensed) to support real and high-fidelity analysis and insights. 
Although this will typically come with a lot of complexities – 
networks, communications and pervasiveness that needing 
resolve during the modelling process. By combining sensed 
and historic data, it becomes easier to observe and connect the 
interrelationships and interdependencies among critical 
infrastructure components, system and sectors. Thus, 
empirical-based modelling techniques seem to better support 
the identification of more recurrent, realistic and suggestive 
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failure patterns, quantifying interdependency-related 
indicators for risk mitigations, supporting emergency 
decision-making and providing validation parameters to 
support other modelling techniques [26].  
 
Agent-based modelling is also very applicable for IoT as 
‘things’ in critical infrastructures can be considered as agents 
that interact with other agents to enable a seamless operation. 
Network-based modelling provides an ability to model 
interdependencies among IoT-based CI systems, especially 
within localised areas. The technique simplifies the derivation 
of insights related to CI representations along topological or 
flow-pattern analysis line, and the evaluation of cascading 
impacts. As the emphasis on fidelity, dependency and 
resilience of CIs increases, interests and support may move 
towards empirical-based modelling, with progressive support 
for network-based, agent-based, and system dynamics-based 
modelling. The lesser emphasis on other modelling techniques 
(such as equation-based, economy-based, etc.) may indicate a 
lack of popularity for their concepts perhaps due to a greater 
complexity in their use. 
 
Although modelling and simulation are applicable to several 
industrial CI sectors, the widest or highest sensitivities seem 
to come from the energy sector. This sector comprises 
electricity, pipeline and oil, and natural gas CIs. 
Transportation, water & waste water, and chemical 
industries also have significant interest and responsiveness. 
These sectors all fall within the category of CNIs defined in 
the UK CPNI documentation [5]. The energy sector is critical 
because several other critical infrastructures depend on its 
products/services. Nearly all other CIs require some form of 
energy source (from an energy sub-sector) to drive their 
functionalities. Thus, the energy sector takes on an almost 
indispensable position within critical infrastructure 
interdependencies. The consequences and impact of energy 
infrastructure failure can inevitably ripple through and affect 
other dependent infrastructures. If unattended to, the effects 
can cause a myriad of damaging cascading outcomes 
(physically, operationally, and economically) in the chain of 
interdependent CIs within a national or global social 
ecosystem. This can explain the greater concerns and 
sensitivities concerning a more secure and continuously 
improving energy sector, as opposed to the lesser emphasis in 
other CIs. 
 
Although the IoT promises huge benefits for CIs like energy 
and transport, it also brings new and complex issues. IoT 
poised to improve energy and transport efficiencies, reliability, 
proactive maintenance, and utilisation visibilities amongst 
other. But there are issues of security, interoperability, 
scalability and logistics needing to be address. Modelling 
provides ways of learning the scales on both perspectives, and 
how they might be addressed. 
 
Emergency services, food &. agriculture, dams appear to 
demonstrate low interests and responsiveness to CIP 
modelling and simulations. This could be because these 
sectors often appear at the tail of CI interdependency chains, 
and typically have low direct and immediate large-scale social 
consequences and impacts when compromised. In addition, 
responses in form of solutions are typically responsive to, and 
trail similar paths as the direction of growing malicious events. 
Moreover, these sectors appear not to be suffering increasing 
cyber-attacks judging by known recorded incidents [43]. 
While it may be rational to focus solutions where there are 
greater threats and risk challenges, the potentials for common 
cause failures are very imminent, hence, it is crucial to also 
give a good measure of attention other CI sectors. 
 
Clearly, empirical-based, network-based, and agent-based 
modelling techniques are the three most widely used 
techniques in fulfilling the risk management framework sub-
stages. System-dynamics-based techniques are typically used 
for simulating continuous system behaviours such as 
estimating the effectiveness of implemented procedures in 
critical infrastructures. Observed consistent patterns suggest 
that empirical-based modelling is more widely employed in 
risk identification, assessment, prioritisation and control 
implementations sub-stages, and less consideration for 
effectiveness evaluations sub-stage.  Network-based modelling 
is widely adopted for risk identification, assessment and 
control implementation. We assume this is so because 
network-based techniques (either topology-based or flow-
based methods) are helpful in capturing interdependency 
characteristics,  CIs descriptions, and identifying the critical 
components with suggestions for emergency protection and 
response improvements  [26]. As IoT continue to find its way 
into CIs, concerns about how to learn their impact on host 
components and interdependencies are likely to influence the 
use of network-based modelling techniques. 
 
In general, results suggest a greater interest on CI researches 
around risk identification, assessment, and control 
implementation in that order. Traits of risk prioritisation and 
effectiveness evaluation do not seem to enjoy much attention 
and research. Thus, the aspects of security risk management 
with the most interests and presumed relevance, as well as 
where the direction of CIP developments tends can be easily 
seen. It reveals that beside identifying and assessing security 
risks on CIs, the next thought in the minds of CI owners and 
operators is what controls to implement to mitigate or 
eliminate characterised risks. This indicates that thinking 
about implementing controls may be viewed as more 
important than first understanding the varied criticality levels 
of security risks before conceiving a strategy for implementing 
controls to yield the highest possible security and resilience 
outcomes. These thoughts need to start shifting towards the 
new risk status that relate to IoT-in-CIs; from identification to 
effectiveness evaluations. New thought directions for modern 
CIs (now with IoT) risk management need to extend to the less 
appreciated significance of assessing the extent to which 
desired CIP has been achieved post control implementation to 
obtain success measures and potential guides for further 
improvements. Common issues and debate seems to pivot 
around the variability of approaches for measuring risks, and 
how such measures are reflective of true system states also 
need to address IoT issues. 
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Quite a few (less than one-fifth) of the CIP approaches 
considered resilience. Greater focus and purpose-driven 
developments tended towards defending malicious attacks or 
compromises on CIs. Contexts that can help reduce attack 
impacts and sustain operations or functionalities during and 
after successful compromises did not enjoy wide 
consideration. This could be because most CIP approaches 
were evolved before the trend of ‘resilience’ – implying they 
were already in use prior to when resilience became a feature 
of significance and concern, and newer/updated versions of 
these approaches are yet unavailable. Alternatively, the 
significance of ensuring resilience may also not have been 
clearly understood by developers as at the time of developing 
some of the approaches - making for why resilience feature is 
not reflected in the tools. Besides implementing preventive 
security, the need to ensure a capacity to continue operations 
– delivering the needed services while managing attacks – is 
ever more important. Clearly, for CNI sectors, disruptions or 
their cascading effects are not welcomed phenomena. 
Anticipation, prevention, absorption, adaptation and rapid 
recovery are essential towards achieving resilience. While 
newer CIP approaches benefit from resilience features, older 
approaches need to be modified to embody resilience where 
missing. As an example, we consider the NIPP-RMF that 
lacked resilience in its maiden version but was later revised in 
2013 to include both security risk and resilience 
characteristics. 
 
Although not having widespread acceptance and inclusion, 
(inter)dependency coverage seems more prevalent than 
resilience in the CIP approaches. The modelling dimensions 
covered include: Component/infrastructure-level (e.g., AIMS, 
MUNICIPAL), operational/functional-level (e.g., 
CASCADE, CIPMA), vulnerability-level (e.g., MIA), 
Cost/Time-dependencies (e.g., CI3), and market effects (e.g., 
CommAspen). Results reveal a growing appreciation of the 
significance of interdependencies in CIP modelling and 
analysis. Private and public CI owners and operators are 
beginning to recognise that learning the relationships amongst 
CI components and systems can greatly support the attainment 
and enhancement of security and resilience. 
 
Again, the few approaches mostly emerge from research 
institutes and academic institutions rather than government 
regulatory agencies. Current outlook also suggests that the 
domain of CIP is more characterised with self-garnered 
defensive solutions rather than being compliance-based 
mediums. This individuality and the differences in security 
problems and requirements can be the drivers for the 
development and adoption of  bespoke protection techniques 
by infrastructure organisations. 
 
From a multi-attribute consideration viewpoint, very few CIP 
approaches currently consider the combined attributes of 
interdependency and resilience. For example, out of 131 
approaches reviewed, only CIMS, CIPMA, and IIM appear to 
satisfy the above criteria. Interestingly, none of these 
approaches applied the more common empirical or network-
based modelling techniques. Rather, these use agent-based and 
system dynamics modelling. This reveals the limitations of 
existing CIP approaches to sufficiently address the security 
dynamics in modern CIs. The level of multi-attribute coverage 
appears to be significantly low compared to the proportion of 
CIP approaches being developed, further suggesting a crucial 
need to upgrade or refine existing approaches to address any 
attribute deficiencies in order to improve their effectiveness. 
 
5  Conclusion and Recommendations 
Arguably, modelling for critical infrastructure protection 
seems not entirely new, as its underlying concepts typically 
relate to safety modelling and analysis. Only that over time, 
has security become relevant and emphasised due to 
technology trends. This has made CI sectors readily 
susceptible to intentional cyber-engineered attacks. Having 
also become so tightly coupled and interdependent, incidents 
show that the compromise, disruption and failure of CIs is not 
only restricted to causes and vectors related to natural 
disasters. Human-initiated actions via technology abuse or 
mal-interventions can be and increasingly are, an influence.  
 
However, what seems new and perhaps not well reflected – at 
least directly in most of the critical infrastructure modelling 
and security approaches (tools, techniques, and 
methodologies) – is the concept of addressing ‘resilience’. 
Most CIP approaches reviewed mainly focus on exploring 
concepts and phenomena related to security, reliability, 
dependability and risks in CIs. We reckon that a plausible 
reason for this may be linked to the early and more widespread 
emphasis on these attributes. Also, it may be attributed to the 
ease in defining and evaluating the above attributes compared 
to evaluating resilience. For example, studies [44] indicate a 
common acknowledgement by power company executives 
about a better comparative convenience for the ease of 
defining and measuring of CI reliability than CI resilience. Be 
this as it may, this apparently intractable attribute is now 
hihgly relevant to meeting the evolving protection needs of CI 
sectors. 
 
The typical contexts that characterise the objectives for 
developing CIP modelling approaches – either tools, 
techniques or methodologies; emphasise the desire to 
understand the dynamic behaviours of CI systems using 
modelling techniques such as agent-based, system dynamics-
based, network-based, and empirical-based techniques. These 
techniques help to identify and characterise the causes of 
functional/operational anomalies and/or disruptions within CI 
setups through determining critical hazards and risks, their 
interdependencies, consequences and impact cascades. CIP 
should embrace modelling and analysis of security-related 
operations, activities and risk management, mostly within the 
confines of specific infrastructure environments and sectors.   
 
In relations to how CIP is modelled, security risk management 
methods drive the process for gaining deeper security-related 
performance insights for CIs to support effective responses. 
Wider interests focus more on the starting sub-stages of risk 
management including: (i) identification of Critical 
infrastructure, hazards and vulnerabilities, and (ii) assessment 
and analysis, of security risks. Empirical-based modelling 
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combined with risk identification, assessment, implementation 
and management of risk are among the most common 
implementation modes. These seem influenced by the growing 
adoption of setups and models that generate or feed-on actual 
scenario data to support CIP sensitivity analysis for decision-
making.  
 
The energy and transportation sectors demonstrate the widest 
concerns and efforts on protecting CNIs. This is not surprising 
as these sectors have higher criticalities and provide services 
that sustain several other sectors.  Less sensitive sectors like 
emergency services, food and agriculture and dams need to 
emulate the drives and actions of the energy and transportation 
sectors, to ensure that they are well-equipped to handle 
security threats when they eventually surface. In balancing the 
trade-off between ‘specificity’ and ‘generality’, their key 
individual benefits need to be considered. Specificity allows 
for more focused context coverage and analysis, which can 
mean better and more tailored solutions, which will mean 
better and more tailored solutions.  Conversely, generality 
enables a tool to be applicable to multiple CI sectors. However, 
a single approach – a tool or technique – cannot support 
holistic security modelling of CIs. A combination of multiple 
approaches – preferably integrated into a tool and technique 
(methodology or framework) – is perhaps the way to go. In 
addition, an approach that includes the pragmatics of 
implementing necessary control actions to curb security risks, 
as well as learning the effectiveness of controls can be a 
preferred solution.  
 
Resilience modelling links to interdependency, and 
interdependency analysis contributes information and insights 
about the degree of cross-systems impact inducible by failures 
or disruptions. It also contributes to the perception on the level 
of resilience achievable in principle and practice. While some 
of the CIP approaches acknowledge and consider dependency 
or cross-dependency relationships and attributes, a larger 
proportion either implicitly include it or utterly overlook it. In 
this era of IoT, advancing technology convergence and system 
hyper-connectivity, understanding the interdependencies 
amongst CI components and systems can strongly make the 
difference between ignorance and knowledge on the nature, 
type, and degree of resilience required to enhance protection 
of CIs. 
 
A significant number of the CIP approaches reviewed emerge 
as instruments developed by government agencies responsible 
for protecting CIs, or by research laboratories, for example the 
Idaho National Laboratory in the USA (who are also funded 
by the government. This could present an effective way for 
government and regulators to encourage a wider use of CIP 
approaches. However, the extent to which government-
sponsored approaches are realistically adopted in the private 
sectors is often unclear or in doubt, since this latter group run 
substantial chunks of CI systems. We posit that policies that 
support easy adoption of approaches are necessary in the above 
regard. Also, the private sector shows mixed responses to 
seamless monitoring and reporting of cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities and incidents. Even in cases where shared 
information, cooperation and assistance can significantly 
support realising acceptable protection of CIs from threats and 
attacks, decisions and actions are often determined by growing 
pressures for business competitive advantage [45].  Policies 
that advance and manage shared and collaborative information 
capability between public (government) and private sector 
stakeholders would be very helpful in this regard. 
 
Clearly, security risks for CIs are evolving along new 
technology pathways where IoT devices and applications are 
finding their ways into CI systems. IoT systems are commonly 
characterised by; variability of scale in components, 
temporality of connections amongst devices, and the 
heterogeneity of actors. These characteristics influence 
conditions that can exist between periodic risk assessments 
without necessarily reporting on instantaneous risk impacts to 
the whole system. Since the risk assessment mode in existing 
CIP approaches are designed to operate statically periodically, 
they lack appropriate capabilities to address the dynamics and 
transient threats in IoT [30], [46], agree that dynamic risk 
assessment has become necessary. Such dynamic assessment 
mode would need to address this looming problem by catering 
for emerging system connectivity in real-time, as well as 
characterising, in clear and timely way, the level of 
temporality of devices in relations to their risk impacts.  
 
Thus, to ensure effective; CIP modelling and simulations, 
sensitivity to dynamic trends, and potentially sustainable and 
efficient ‘Living in the IoT’, this study recommends that,  
 
i. Other security conscious but less-responsive critical 
infrastructure sectors such as emergency services, food & 
agriculture, and dams; should draw lessons from the 
efforts of the energy and transportation sectors. 
Analogous approaches should increase the ability to 
evaluate and understand security risks to attendant 
infrastructures and operations. They can support better 
understanding of any associated dependencies and 
cascading impacts and improve understanding of how to 
establish effective security and resilience. The decision-
making processes related to measuring the effectiveness 
of readiness activities and investments will be improved, 
as well as the behavioural responses to CI disturbances 
or disruptions in the sectors. 
 
ii. Newer or updated CIP modelling approaches should be 
developed or revised to capture scope of IoT in security 
risk management – from identification to effectiveness 
evaluations. This is to support appropriate alignments 
and responsiveness to the evolving trends introduced by 
new technologies such as IoT and IIoT. Such approaches 
also need to adopt dynamic and real-time assessment 
processes to address the issues introduced by IoT in CIs, 
and the high impact security risks that emerge. 
 
iii. A strong public-private sector partnership is important 
and should be vigorously pursued by both stakeholder 
groups to achieve better security and resilience in CIs. 
Such collaboration can empower the public sector to 
monitor, in timely and efficiently ways, and to aggregate 
information about CI security threats, vulnerabilities, 
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incidents and impacts as they emerge. The public sector 
can also provide the risk information to private sector 
operators to help them ensure an informed and well-
organised security management.  
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Appendix A: Selection Study Sample of Critical Infrastructure Protection Approaches 
CIP Approaches Full Meaning Purpose Description Web Link 
ACT Attack Countermeasure Tree 
Tool for developing attack scenarios, identification and selection of 
best countermeasures. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5466633/ 
ActivitySim Activity Simulator Used for modelling the activity representation of US population http://permalink.lanl.gov/object/tr?what=info:lanl-repo/lareport/LA-UR-08-07134 
ADVISE 
Adversary-Driven State-
based System Security 
Evaluation 
Tool for simulating attacks on systems, and evaluating the probability 
of attack success. 
https://www.perform.illinois.edu/Papers/USAN_papers
/10VAN02.pdf 
AIMS Agent-based Infrastructure Modelling and Simulation) 
Used for analysing the behaviour of interdependent critical 
infrastructure systems http://ebagheri.athabascau.ca/papers/ijbpim.pdf 
AIMSUN 
Advanced Interactive 
Microscopic Simulator for 
Ur-ban and Non-Urban 
Networks 
Used for Traffic Modelling and Simulation https://www.aimsun.com/aimsun-next/ 
AMTI Loki Toolkit 
Advanced Modelling & 
Techniques Investigation 
(Loki Toolkit 
Used for modelling and studies of complex adaptive  system of systems 
related to critical infrastructure interdependencies 
http://prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-
control.cgi/2012/121117.pdf 
 
AT/FP 
Anti-Terrorism/Force 
Protection 
 
Modelling and planning the perimeter and waterway security of ships in 
ports 
https://savage.nps.edu/RobotTelemetry/DonCioXmlWg
NpsSlides/NPSATFPProjectFlyer.2007Apr19.pdf 
ATAV-SCADA 
Attack Trees for Accessing 
Vulnerabilities in SCADA 
(Canada) 
Tool for calculating the characteristics of the highest attack event 
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Use-of-
Attack-Trees-in-Assessing-in-SCADA-Byres-
Franz/02fa72c0bfd76c731201156f81c40952b9da80d1 
Athena - 
Used for modelling, identifying and ranking most dependent 
components/nodes, component/infrastructure vulnerability analysis, 
direct , cumulative and cascading impacts of changes to infrastructure 
systems. It also identifies cascading, cumulative, direct and indirect 
effects on nodes. Used for developing dependency and consequence 
reasoning support to the critical infrastructure (transportation) 
architecture. 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnu
mber=5067457  
ATOM 
Air Transportation 
Optimization Model 
 
Used for modelling and evaluating the consequences of partial or total 
outage at an airport or set of airports for a prolonged period of time. 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YtXvAgAAQBAJ
&pg=PA32&lpg=PA32&dq=Air+Transport+Optimis
ation+Model+-+ATOM&source=bl&ots=JGVn-
y2lvK&sig=3dEXuQBYKh-
FrstfbM_wygvNJ_4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwio
57WJnabcAhWQxIUKHZXdCkoQ6AEwB3oECAIQAQ
#v=onepage&q=Air%20Transport%20Optimisation%
20Model%20-%20ATOM&f=false 
BIRR 
Better Infrastructure Risk 
and Resilience 
 
Used for assessing vulnerabilities and reporting of risks http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html  
BLDMP Boolean Logic Driven Markov Processes 
Tool for modelling attacks, characterizing and quantifying potential 
sequences and steps for attacks. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S095
1832017301850 
BMI 
Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures – Baseline 
Protection Concept 
(German Government) 
A Methodical plan for risk identification, assessment and control in 
critical infrastructure domains through cooperation between public and 
private infrastructure operators. 
https://www.preventionweb.net/files/9266_2967Protect
ionofCriticalInfrastruct.pdf 
CAPRA 
Comprehensive Approach 
for Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment 
Used for modelling, assessing and reporting disaster risk from a 
probabilistic point of view https://www.ecapra.org 
CARVER2 
Criticality Accessibility 
Recoverability 
Vulnerability Espyability 
Redundancy 
Used for modelling and prioritization of threats and terrorist targets http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC70046/lbna25286enn.pdf 
CASCADE  Used for modelling and analysis of cascading disruptions and failures in large and interconnected infrastructures 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnu
mber=1385362 
CEEESA 
Centre for energy, 
environmental, and 
economic systems analysis 
(Argonne National 
Laboratories) 
Tools for analyzing network vulnerabilities, modelling gas flows and 
infrastructure losses https://ceeesa.es.anl.gov 
CERT Initiatives EU CERT group members:  Methodologies for adopting and implementing security teams and capabilities for managing and protecting national critical infrastructures http://www.egc-group.org/contact.html 
CERT/CSIRT 
Computer (emergency) 
security incident response 
team (Carnegie Mellon 
University) 
Tool for monitoring, identification, and prevention of computer security 
and related incidents 
https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/Handbook/20
03_002_001_14102.pdf 
CI3 
Critical Infrastructure 
Interdependencies 
Integrator 
Used for modelling and estimating the time and costs for partial or 
complete restoration of critical infrastructures after disruptions or 
failures. 
http://www.ipd.anl.gov/anlpubs/2002/03/42598.pdf 
CIDA 
Critical Infrastructure 
Dependency Analysis tool 
 
Used for modelling and analysis of the dynamics of cascading failures 
with time. Also used to model and analyze interdependencies and risk 
reductions 
https://github.com/geostergiop/CIDA/wiki 
CIMS Critical Infrastructure Modeling System 
Analysis of risk and visualization of cascading impacts of operational 
anomalies. Used for sensitivity analysis, policy, regulations, and 
response planning. 
http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html 
CIMSuite Critical Infrastructure Modelling Suite 
Used for proactive modelling of critical infrastructure targeted 
disruptions (natural and human-initiated). 
http://www4vip.inl.gov/factsheets/docs/cimsuite.pdf 
 
CIP/DSS 
Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Decision Support 
System 
Used for comparative modelling and analysis of risk mitigation 
strategies on individual infrastructures. Uses scenario-based impact 
analysis results. 
http://public.lanl.gov/dp/CIP.html 
CIPDSS-DM 
Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Decision Support 
System Decision Model 
Used for modelling decision-making under risks and uncertainty 
conditions http://www.ipd.anl.gov/anlpubs/2008/12/63060.pdf 
CIPMA 
Critical Infra-structure 
Protection Modeling and 
Analysis 
 
Used for evaluating failures, dependencies and resilience of critical 
infrastructure, as well as cascading impacts on other infrastructures. 
Supports the development of policies and regulations for national 
security 
http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html 
CISIA 
Critical Infrastructure 
Simulation by 
Interdependent Agents 
Used for modelling agents/system interdependencies, and analysis of 
emergency responses and their origin. 
http://www.chiarafoglietta.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Cisia.pdf 
To be published in PETRAS/IET Conference Living in the Internet of Things: Cybersecurity of the IoT - 2019 
13 
 
CIP Approaches Full Meaning Purpose Description Web Link 
 
COMM-ASPEN Agent-based simulation model of the US economy 
Used for modelling the effects of market decision and disruptions of 
telecommunications infrastructure to the economy. http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html 
CORAS-BRA-
SCADA 
CORAS-Based Risk 
Assessment for SCADA 
(USA). 
Tool for modelling the risks of ICS prototypes using the CORAS 
framework 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3143/940955a76a496
46ba2954e0735a0ec18d7ca.pdf 
COUNTERACT 
Cluster of User Networks in 
Transport and Energy 
relating to Anti-terrorist 
Activities 
Used for risk assessment, mitigation and reporting http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html 
CSASG-SCADA 
Systems with Game 
Models 
Cyber Security Analysis of 
Smart Grid SCADA 
Information Security (USA) 
Tool for identifying the best action strategy for attackers and defenders, 
and relative payoffs. https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2602089 
CSRA-NPP 
Cyber Security Risk 
Assessment in Nuclear 
Power Plants (Korea) 
Tool for identifying and characterizing risk assessment activities at 
initial design stages 
http://koreascience.or.kr/article/ArticleFullRecord.jsp?
cn=OJRHBJ_2012_v44n8_919 
Cy-T SCADA RF Cyber-Terrorism SCADA Risk Framework (Australia) Measuring cyber-terrorism threats and implementing control measures 
http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004
&context=isw 
DECRIS Risk and Decision Systems for Critical Infrastructures 
Used for risk and vulnerability analyses that focus on critical 
infrastructure  (drinking water, energy supply, transportation, ICT) 
interdependencies. 
https://www.sintef.no/projectweb/samrisk/decris/ 
DEW 
Distributed engineering 
workstation (Electrical 
Distribution Design, Inc. 
Sponsored by DOE and 
DoD) 
Tool for identification and analysis of interdependencies, asset 
management, and operations planning for power systems. https://www.eee.hku.hk/~cees/software/dew.htm 
DMRIM-SCADA 
System 
Digraph Model for Risk 
Identification and 
Management in SCADA 
System (USA). 
Tool for vulnerability identification, faults and failure diagnosis, and 
risk impact assessment. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5983990/ 
DUTCH NRA Dutch Government Tool used for analyzing threats and hazards using multi-criteria decision making techniques to achieve reduction of risks. 
https://english.nctv.nl/binaries/poster-st-geneva-2015-
analyst-network-(8)_tcm32-84227.pdf 
EAR-PILAR National Cryptology Centre Spain 
A tool for asset characterization, risk (threats, vulnerabilities, and 
impacts) modelling, and control evaluations. Considers identification, 
classification, ratings, and dependencies amongst assets 
http://www.pilar-
tools.com/en/tools/pilar/v71/index.html 
ECI-GIS 
Geographic information 
systems and risk assessment 
(EU sponsored Joint 
Research Centre). 
A tool for modelling operational continuity following loss and damage 
of critical infrastructures. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/38613171.pdf 
EMCAS Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System 
Used for modelling and evaluating operational and economic impacts 
of various external events on complex power systems (e.g. electricity) https://www.energyplan.eu/othertools/national/emcas/ 
EpiSimS Epidemic Simulations Used for modeling and analysis of the spread of diseases http://public.lanl.gov/sdelvall/p556-mniszewski.pdf 
EPRAM Electric Restoration Analysis Tools Used for modelling electric power restoration 
http://www.mssanz.org.au/modsim2013/D2/stamber.pd
f 
ERC-SCADA 
System-Petri Net 
Analysis 
Evaluating the Risk of 
Cyber Attacks on SCADA 
Systems via Petri Net 
Analysis. 
Tool for evaluating operational risks using non-probabilistic metrics 
approach. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5168093/ 
EURACOM 
European Risk Assessment 
and Contingency Planning 
Methodologies for 
Interconnected Energy 
Networks 
All-hazard risk assessment and contingency scheduling. http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html 
FAIT 
Fast Analysis Infrastructure 
Tool  (Sandia National Lab, 
sponsored by US DHS) 
Knowledge base tool (including emergency network and 
georeferencing data) for performing economic impact analysis across 
multiple critical infrastructure sectors. 
http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html 
FastTrans Los Alamos National Lab 
A parallel microsimulator tool for transportation networks for 
simulating and routing very large numbers of vehicles on real-world 
road networks in a fraction of real time. 
https://www.lanl.gov/orgs/adtsc/publications/science_h
ighlights_2011/docs/6InfoSciPDFs/sunil.pdf 
FEPVA 
Framework for Electricity 
Production Vulnerability 
Assessment (Los Alamos 
National Lab) 
Tool for assessing the potential impact of natural disasters or malicious 
attacks for both response and preventative purposes. Specifically used 
to determine the power plants with impact potentials and the extent 
feasible. 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GOVPUB-C13-
f3de19ca7b535ba3207a5be512241f84/pdf/GOVPUB-
C13-f3de19ca7b535ba3207a5be512241f84.pdf 
FINSIM 
Financial System 
Infrastructure  (Los Alamos 
National Lab) 
Tool for modelling financial service sector as a complex decentralized 
system with multiple interacting autonomous decision nodes or agents 
such as banks, traders, markets, and brokers. 
https://cnls.lanl.gov/annual26/abstracts.html 
FMEA/FMECA Failure Mode Effect and Criticality analysis 
Technique for analyzing probable system failures, enumerating 
potential impacts, and classifying  control and mitigation actions. 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/aba3/1bf32898f29ea5
6be2e1f5b4f99938face35.pdf 
Fort Future US Army Corps of Engineers 
A tool that follows a multiple simulation approach for multi-criteria 
decision support. Used for simulating test plans for Department of 
Defense installations, and evaluating a set of alternatives. 
https://ascelibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.1061/40794%28179
%2922 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis A deductive technique for evaluating risk causes from a combination of inputs. 
http://asq.org/quality-progress/2002/03/problem-
solving/what-is-a-fault-tree-analysis.html 
GAMS-CERO 
ERA Enterprise Risk Assessment 
Technique for managing and mitigating risk using administrative 
procedures and resources. http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html 
GIS Interoperability Geographical Information Systems Interoperability 
A methodology for emergency coordination and support using 
geographical information systems. 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=eoB6nTkhLqkC&
pg=PA388&lpg=PA388&dq=Challenges+for+the+ap
plication+of+GIS+interoperability+in+emergency+m
anagement&source=bl&ots=A9AYBmqk0n&sig=EaY
UOn_X24FOalYX3rXlAvFVyuw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=
2ahUKEwjRqIHz67XdAhUHLewKHTCiBo0Q6AEwAH
oECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q=Challenges%20for%20th
e%20application%20of%20GIS%20interoperability%2
0in%20emergency%20management&f=false 
GoRAF University of New Brunswick (Canada) 
A tool for critical infrastructure resource identification, and metric-
based estimation of economic losses. 
https://www.inderscienceonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1504/IJ
RAM.2007.015297  
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Analysis 
Technique for system examination and risk management based on 
theory of assumptions that risk events occur due to deviations from 
design and operating plans. 
http://pqri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/pdf/HAZOP_Training_Guide.
pdf 
HCSim Healthcare Simulation (Los Alamos National Lab) 
A modelling tool for assessing the impact of mass casualties in health 
care and public health institutions (e.g., hospitals) 
https://permalink.lanl.gov/object/tr?what=info:lanl-
repo/lareport/LA-UR-13-24605 
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HM-BRMCI 
Hierarchical, model-based 
risk Management of Critical 
Infrastructures 
Tool for automating the definition of risk mitigation plans and 
activities. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S095
1832009000349 
HURT Hurricane Re-location Tool (Los Alamos National Lab) A tool for modelling the relocation of Hurricane http://www.lanl.gov 
HYDRA Pop & 
Eco Modeling (Los Alamos National Lab) 
Integrated service-oriented architevture tool for modeling and 
simulating infrastructures with seamless interoperability. https://public.lanl.gov/rbent/hydra-with-cover.pdf 
I2SIM 
Infrastructures 
Interdependencies 
Simulation (University of 
British Columbia) 
A tool for simulating scenarios for disaster responses at system level 
with impact characterization. http://www.ece.ubc.ca/%7Ejiirp/ 
ICS-CDTP 
Industrial Control System 
Cyber Defense Triage 
Process 
Tool for threat analysis, attack modelling, and control and 
countermeasure applications 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016
7404817301505 
IEISS 
Interdependent 
Environment for Infra-
structure System 
Simulations (University of 
Virginia) 
 
A modelling tool for simulating electricity and natural gas flow, outage 
characteristics, and system interdependencies. http://www.bwbush.io/projects/ieiss.html 
IIM 
Inoperability In-put-Output 
Model (Sandia National 
Labs and Los Alamos 
National Labs) 
A tool for sector-based economic impact analysis of infrastructure 
attacks and failures. 
https://ascelibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.1061/%28ASCE%29
1076-0342%282005%2911%3A2%2867%29 
Infrastructure 
Disruptions - 
Tool for modelling the state of infrastructure systems under abnormal 
conditions, and evaluating the economic consequences of 
abnormalities. 
http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html 
INTEPOINT VU IntePoint LLC 
A modelling tool that combines various techniques for complex 
environments analysis and system-wide interdependencies modelling 
across physical, virtual and social networks. 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/el/ms
id/Critical_Infrastructure.pdf 
IRAM 
Infrastructure risk analysis 
model (US Military 
Academy) 
Tool used to model and simulate resource allocation for interconnected 
infrastructure reliability. Used for risk quantification. 
https://ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/%28ASCE%29107
6-0342%282000%296%3A3%28114%29 
IRAM-SCADA 
INFORMATION 
Sec 
Improved Risk Assessment 
Method for SCADA 
Information Security 
(Serbia) 
Evaluating the effectiveness of intrusion, detection, and prevention 
systems in controlling attacks. 
http://eejournal.ktu.lt/index.php/elt/article/view/8027/4
033 
IRRIIS 
Integrated Risk Reduction 
of In-formation-based Infra-
structure Systems (IRRIIS 
Project, EU) 
Interdependency and resilience modelling, analysis and management of 
critical infrastructures https://www.irriis.org 
Knowledge Mgt & 
Visualisation Carnegie Mellon University Tool for analyzing vulnerabilities related to the distribution of fuel https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/sti/3489532.pdf 
LogiSims Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Tool for modelling and planning preparation for a disasters and 
concurrent responses to a disaster http://public.lanl.gov/rbent/bent-pes.pdf 
LS-DYNA Livermore Software Technology Corporation 
A tool for modelling large complex system structures and behaviours 
related to failures such as: changing boundary conditions, deformations, 
crashes and explosions. 
http://www.lstc.com/products/ls-dyna 
LUND 
University of Lund 
(Sweden). Sponsored by the 
International Energy 
Agency 
Grounded Network theory methodology for modelling the relationships 
between nodes in a system of roads or rail interconnected transport 
infrastructure. 
https://www.iea.lth.se/publications/Theses/LTH-IEA-
1061.pdf  
MARGERIT V2 Spanish Ministry for Public Administrations 
methodology for Risk Analysis and Management for security of 
computer systems, digital and data networks. 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/threat-risk-
management/risk-management/current-risk/risk-
management-inventory/rm-ra-methods/m_magerit.html 
MBRA 
Model-Based Risk 
Assessment (Naval 
Postgraduate School, Center 
for Homeland Defense & 
Security) 
Analysis of critical infrastructure network components and faults for 
efficient resource allocation https://www.chds.us/ed/items/2164 
MIA 
Methodology for 
Interdependency 
Assessment 
A methodology for identifying and characterizing critical 
interdependencies of the systems in relations security vulnerabilities. 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-
3-642-21694-7_1.pdf 
MIITS 
Multi-Scale Integrated 
Information & 
Telecommunications 
System (Los Alamos 
National Laboratories) 
A tool for simulating high fidelity network topology, internet 
communication sessions and packets, and actual scalability 
representations. 
 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4117861/ 
MIN 
Multi-layer Infrastructure 
Networks (Purdue 
University) 
A simulation tool  for solving flow equilibrium and optimal budget 
allocation problem related to automobile, urban freight and data 
network layer 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs110
67-005-2627-0.pdf 
Modular Dynamic 
Model Sandia National Laboratory 
A tool for modelling and simulating energy infrastructure 
interdependency operations  including generation, transmission, 
distributions and trading. 
https://www.sandia.gov/nisac-ssl/wp/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2012/04/a-modular-
dynamic-simulation-model.pdf 
MSM 
MIT Screening 
Methodology (MIT = 
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) 
A methodology for prioritizing vulnerabilities http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html 
MUNICIPAL 
Multi-Network 
Interdependent Critical 
Infrastructure Program for 
Analysis of Lifelines 
(Rensselaer Poly-technic 
Institute, USA) 
A decision support tool simulating infrastructure moving parts and 
interdependencies within coastal regions to define optimal response 
before, during and after hazards. 
http://eaton.math.rpi.edu/faculty/Mitchell/papers/decisi
ontechnologies.pdf 
N-ABLE 
National A-gent-Based 
Laboratory for Economics 
(Sandia National 
Laboratories and Los 
Alamos National 
Laboratories) 
A tool for analyzing economic factors, responses and downstream 
consequences of infrastructure interdependencies http://www.dis.anl.gov/projects/ri.html 
NEMO 
Net-Centric Effects-based 
Operations Model (Sparta, 
Inc.) 
A tool for modelling impact cascades of events through multiple 
infrastructure networks, and determining the results of  course of 
actions. 
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/10th_ICCRTS/CD/pape
rs/128.pdf 
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Neptune Tides Neptune Navigation Software (UK) A tool for simulating wind speed and analysis of flood surges. http://www.neptunenavigation.co.uk/tides.htm 
Net-Centric GIS York University A tool that used to support decision making propositions using GIS interoperability features. https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/sti/3489532.pdf 
NEXUS Fusion 
Framework IntePoint, LLC 
A tool for modelling and visualizing planned and unplanned effects and 
consequences of an event through multiple infrastructures https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/projects/nexus/  
NGAT 
Natural Gas Analysis Tools 
(Argonne National 
Laboratories) 
A tool for modelling natural gas pipeline infrastructures https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/sti/3489532.pdf 
NGFast Natural Gas Fast (Argonne National Laboratory) 
A tool for simulating natural gas systems, and impact assessment of 
pipeline breaks or failures. 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber
=4419711 
NIPP-RMF 
National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan – Risk 
Management Framework 
(Dept. of Homeland 
Security) 
A process methodology for risk management for protecting critical 
infrastructures. It combines threats, vulnerability and consequence 
analysis to drive prioritization of effective controls to minimize 
impacts. 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_RiskMgmt.p
df 
NSRAM 
Network Security Risk 
Assessment Method (James 
Madison University) 
 
Analysis of cyber and physical infrastructure security risks, determining 
the response nature of system to attacks and incidents 
https://works.bepress.com/george_h_baker/12/downloa
d/ 
NSRM Network Security Risk Model 
Methodology used to support the selection of  risk management 
countermeasures and controls 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1539
-6924.2008.01151.x 
OGC CIPI 
Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Initiative (Open 
Geospatial Consortium) 
A methodology for managing emergency incidents through inter-
agency data exchange and alert notifications 
http://www.opengeospatial.org/projects/initiatives/cipi
1.2 
PCI-Information 
Projects of Common 
Information (Joint Research 
Centre, Sponsored by the 
European Commission) 
A methodology for standardizing  energy communication systems  of 
European Union stakeholders and regulators 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/pr
ojects-common-interest 
PFNAM 
Petroleum Fuels Network 
Analysis Model (Argonne 
National Laboratories) 
A tool for hydraulic computation of crude oil and petroleum products 
transportation via pipelines. http://www.gss.anl.gov/publications-2/ 
PipelineNet 
US Federal Emergency 
Management Agency and 
the Environmental 
Protection Agency 
A GIS-based tool for modelling the flow and concentration of 
contaminants in water pipeline infrastructures. Also used to estimate 
risks to public water supply. 
https://www.tswg.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Pi
pelineNet%20TB.pdf 
PMU-Based 
RAFPCS 
PMU-Based Risk 
Assessment Framework for 
Power Control Systems 
(USA) 
Tool for real-time monitoring cyber intrusion impacts on the 
behaviours/dynamics of power systems. 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber
=6672731 
QCRREM 
Quantitative Cyber Risk 
Reduction Estimation 
Methodology (USA) 
Tool for evaluating risk reductions in an enhanced security SCADA 
System. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1579754/ 
QCSRAM-SCADA 
Quantitative Cyber Security 
Risk Assessment 
Methodology 
Tool for assessing vulnerabilities from historic data related to threats, 
asset value, and outage costs https://www.scientific.net/AMR.960-961.1602 
QMACSR-SCADA 
Systems 
Quantitative Methodology 
to Assess Cyber Security 
Risk of SCADA Systems 
(Korea) 
Tool for calculating cyber threats expected damage https://www.scientific.net/AMR.960-961.1602 
QTRIM 
Quantitative Threat-Risk 
Index Model (Idaho 
National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory) 
Tool used for evaluating security risks in relations to terrorist attacks 
against national infrastructures. https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/sites/sti/sti/2535260.pdf 
QualNet Scalable Network Technologies, Inc 
A tool for modelling and analysing the behaviour of real 
communications networks. 
https://web.scalable-networks.com/qualnet-network-
simulator-software 
R-NAS 
Railroad Net-work Analysis 
System (Sandia National 
Laboratories and Los 
Alamos National 
Laboratories) 
 
A tool for modelling the impacts to the flow of commodities over the 
rail network and infrastructure in the US, especially when one or more 
components of the rail system are unavailable. 
https://www.sandia.gov/nisac-ssl/wp/wp-
content/uploads/RNAS-20160119_SAND2016-
1408M.pdf 
RA-SCADA 
Railways 
Risk Assessment in GPS-
based SCADA for Railways 
(USA) 
Identification of the origin of risks 
https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0167404815001388/1-s2.0-
S0167404815001388-main.pdf?_tid=dd19f4ca-8664-
4262-86fb-
3a4c728f32a1&acdnat=1534163806_56cd404652f32b
69a028bf6a20a63b3d 
RADR Risk Assessment Detection and Response Identifying sensors with high priorities for prioritizing security budgets 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ee2e/e3dca15c4836b0
7c7a0e2c265329a9298901.pdf 
RAIM 
Real-time Monitoring, 
Anomaly detections, Impact 
analysis, and Mitigation 
Strategies SCADA security 
framework 
A tool for real-time monitoring and anomaly detection,  impact analysis 
and security control implementations in power control SCADA 
infrastructure networks. 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5477189/ 
RAMCA Risk-Assessment Model for Cyber Attacks. Tool for calculating summed losses on revenue related to cyber-attacks. 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8a41/a48819b6ecf624
24bb4d6041a8a31a630cfe.pdf 
RAMCAP-Plus 
Risk Analysis and 
Management for Critical 
Asset Protection Plus 
(American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers) 
A methodology for the assessment of risk and resilience and 
prioritization across all critical infrastructure sectors http://files.asme.org/ASMEITI/RAMCAP/17978.pdf 
Restore 
Interdependent Repair and 
Restoration Processes 
(Argonne National 
Laboratories) 
A tool for modelling the restoration and recovery of critical 
infrastructure systems from incidents. Used to estimate time and cost 
attributes of restoration goals. 
http://www.anl.gov/egs/group/resilient-
infrastructure/resilient-infrastructure-capabilities 
Risk Maps Risk Mapping, Planning and Assessment. 
A Methodology for systematic risk inventory management including 
support planning to reduce risk impacts 
https://www.fema.gov/risk-mapping-assessment-and-
planning-risk-map 
RMGCIS 
Risk Management Guide for 
Critical Infrastructure 
Sectors (Canada) 
A methodology for risk and resilience assessment and control 
implementations. 
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rsk-
mngmnt-gd/rsk-mngmnt-gd-eng.pdf 
RTDS Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS Technologies Inc) 
A tool for real-time simulating and testing the changing behavior of 
power systems. https://www.rtds.com 
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RVA 
Risk and Vulnerability 
Analysis (Danish 
Emergency Management 
Agency) 
A methodology for analyzing threats, vulnerabilities and risks in critical 
infrastructure sectors. It also supports prioritization for effective 
vulnerability and risk controls. 
http://brs.dk/eng/inspection/contingency_planning/Doc
uments/RVA-model_user_%20guide.pdf 
S-RAM 
Risk Assessment 
methodology (Sandia 
National laboratory) 
A methodology for automated assessment of risks and resilience related 
to physical critical infrastructure attacks 
https://prod.sandia.gov/techlib-noauth/access-
control.cgi/2008/088143.pdf 
SAIV 
Security of Activities of 
Vital Importance (French 
Government) 
Methodology  for protection critical infrastructures based on private-
public sector discussions, and priority-based support of security across 
critical infrastructure sectors. 
https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/cybersecurity-in-france/ciip-
in-france/faq/ 
SC-Based ARAC 
Scenario-based Approach to 
Risk Analysis in Support of 
Cyber Security (USA) 
Used to support effective resource allocation in finances and personnel 
for critical attacks 
https://inis.iaea.org/search/searchsinglerecord.aspx?re
cordsFor=SingleRecord&RN=43118741 
SessionSim Los Alamos National Laboratories A tool for generating realistic communication sessions or data traffic https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5429274/ 
SIERRA 
System for Import/Export 
Routing and Recovery 
Analysis (Sandia National 
Laboratories and Los 
Alamos National 
Laboratories) 
A tool for modelling and estimating flow diversion between ports. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1142053 
SRM-ICSP 
Security Risk Methodology 
for Instrumentation and 
Control System Processes 
Tool for assessing cyber risks for nuclear instrumentation and control 
systems using Bayesian networks and event tree modelling techniques. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S173
8573316302935 
TEVA 
Threat Ensemble 
Vulnerability Assessment 
(EPA) 
A tool for analysing the vulnerabilities of water distribution systems, 
measuring public health and economic impacts, and modelling threat 
mitigation and response strategies. 
https://ascelibrary.org/doi/abs/10.1061/40737%28200
4%29482 
TIMQAV-CIS 
Two Indices Method for 
Quantitative Assessment of 
the Vulnerability of Critical 
Information Systems 
Tool use to support informed decisions about countermeasures related 
to security vulnerabilities. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026
8401208000054?via%3Dihub 
TRAGIS 
Transportation Routing 
Analysis Geographic 
Information System (Oak 
Ridge National 
Laboratories) 
A tool for modelling transportation (rail, waterway and highway) 
routing https://web.ornl.gov/sci/gist/TRAGIS_2005.pdf 
TranSims 
Transportation Analysis 
Simulation System (Los 
Alamos National 
Laboratories) 
A tool for simulating vehicular movements, and analyzing the 
consequences of urban transportation system. https://code.google.com/archive/p/transims/ 
UIS Urban Infrastructure Suite (Los Alamos National Lab) 
A tool for  simulating interactive urban infrastructures, their behaviours 
and effects of interdependencies. http://www.sandia.gov/nisac/uis.html   
UML-CI 
University of New 
Brunswick, Fredericton, 
Canada 
A reference method for modelling infrastructure systems high-level 
metamodels to aid system profiling and management. 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10796-008-
9127-y 
UPMoST 
Urban Population Mobility 
Simulation Technologies 
(National Infrastructure 
Simulation and Analysis 
Center) 
A tool used to model the movement of entities across multiple domains 
and interfaces. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/1265180/ 
USArmy Risk 
Mitigation 
Los Alamos National 
Laboratory 
A tool for simulating  the management of fresh water network 
infrastructure in relations to usage at U.S. military bases. 
https://www.systemdynamics.org/assets/conferences/20
01/papers/Lee_MA_1.pdf  
VACSPI 
Vulnerability Assessment of 
Cyber Security in Power 
Industry 
For estimating cyber vulnerability indices of infrastructures in the 
power sector. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4076075/ 
VAM-SCADA 
Security 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Methodology for SCADA 
Security 
Tool for assessing vulnerabilities and the security of SCADA system https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/sites/sti/sti/3562811.pdf 
VINCI 
Virtual Interacting network 
Community (University of 
Pisa, Italy) 
A tool for modelling secure network management architecture for 
critical infrastructures using virtualization capabilities. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5628730/ 
VISAC 
Visual Interactive Site 
Analysis Code (Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory) 
A tool for analysing accidents/incidents at nuclear or industrial 
facilities, and modelling the range of damaged and downtime. https://www.visac.ornl.gov/HelpFiles/iitsec02.html 
WISE 
Water Infrastructure 
Simulation Environment 
(Los Alamos National 
Laboratories) 
A tool for infrastructure and interdependency analysis of water and 
waste water flows. 
https://ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/40792%28173%29
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